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Abstract: The study of ancient magic is complicated by the fact that most of ancient Greek and Latin 
terms usually translated by “magic” or “magical” were used in different and contradictory ways. 
Approaches trying to reconcile rather than expose these different meanings can be divided in two 
large groups: the so-called essentialist approach, exemplified here by the work of H.S. Versnel and 
the sociological approach, represented here by the work of P. Bourdieu. Against these two 
approaches, it has also been argued that the modern term “magic” should be abandoned. Against this 
last position, I will first repeat – as Versnel and others already did – that we cannot represent alien 
(i.e. foreign or ancient) categories of thought without using our own categories. Finally, I will 
present Versnel’s methodology, its problems, and the solution that Bourdieu’s notion of the religious 
field can provide. While not without problems, it gives an idea of what could be gained by tinkering 




The problem with the use of broad analytical 
concepts in historiography is that these 
concepts never simply represent the past. 
They give meaning to ancient or otherwise 
alien words, which, in turn, are preserved or 
transformed by the work of the historian. By 
explaining ancient words with modern ones, 
historians gives to the latter a transhistorical 
or transcultural quality. 1  Historiography, 
whether it manipulates categories such as 
religion, magic or power, surreptitiously 
forces readers to comply with an implicit 
definition or redefinition of the main 
categories by which it apprehends the past. 
                                            
1  By “category of thought” I mean the categories 
by which we classify known and newly discov-
ered phenomena, and which gain credibility by 
being imbedded in a larger set of related cate-
gories. 
This, in a nutshell, is the main methodo-
logical problem one encounters when 
studying ancient magic. In the following, I 
will first make the case that this so-called 
problem is a fundamental fact of the 
historiography of ideas. I will then present 
an overview of the use of the theories of 
magic in the last hundred years of research 
on ancient Greek- and Latin-speaking 
societies. Finally, I will pick up the problem 
of studying ancient magic where Hendrik S. 
Versnel left it and present Pierre Bourdieu’s 
theory of the “religious field” [champ 
religieux] as a possible solution My main 
message is that banning words from our 
vocabulary is not going to make our cogni-
tive habits disappear. A more practical 
solution would be to define the concepts we 
use at the outset. 
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Now for my own disclosure: it is true that 
magic is a loaded term that reveals one’s 
own views and that its modern meaning – 
something like “the manipulation of 
extraordinary power through unexplained or 
pseudo-religious means” – is not well suited 
to represent what scholars usually perceive 
as magic in ancient Greek and Latin sources. 
For these reasons, some have questioned the 
use of the word or have requested that it be 
abandoned.2The anachronism and relative 
inaccuracy of the different modern concepts 
of magic, however, are irrelevant inasmuch 
as writing about ancient words always 
implies the use of modern words used to 
translate them. Abandoning the term magic 
will not change anything about the fact that 
individuals now identify certain religious-
like phenomena in a specific class, which 
they call magic. If we abandon the word 
magic because it does not perfectly translate 
ancient Greek or Latin words, we might as 
well abandon the words religion and science 
in the study of Greek and Roman antiquity.3 
Historiography is a form of discourse that 
produces truth-claims and which conse-
quently generalizes personal view-points. 
We should not be surprised that descriptions 
of past ideas that have failed to convince 
appear anachronistic, ethnocentric or idio-
syncratic. Disagreements over a theory are 
not sufficient to believe that a field of 
research is moribund. Since theories can 
always escape falsification by the addition 
of ad hoc rules, we should rather encourage 
scientific fields to foster different 
approaches to the same problem.4 In the 
                                            
2  See, e.g., Gager 1999; Otto 2011; Otto 2013 
(see, however, Otto – Stausberg 2013); Hane-
graaff 2012, 166–168. 
3  See Otto 2013, 320–321, who, despite recogniz-
ing this, suggested that it would be more prag-
matic to use a critical definition of religion and 
to abandon the concept of magic. 
4  Feyerabend 1975. 
history of ideas perhaps more than in other 
historiographical domains, the past is never 
simply represented. It is rather translated 
and adapted. Both of the articles analysed 
below implicitly address this problem: 
Versnel suggests that “our” concepts might 
be similar to those of the ancient Greeks; 
Bourdieu, that similar social structures 
should obtain in societies in which the same 
level of division of labour was attained. 
One popular and simple way to represent the 
task of distinguishing between ancient and 
modern words is to distinguish between the 
emic and etic stages of research. The emic 
stage would here consist in the study of 
words through categories current in the 
culture studied. The etic stage consists in the 
translation of these categories of thought 
into a model devised by the researcher As 
Kenneth Pike originally argued, these two 
movements are practically inseparable.5 In 
theory, at least, it would be useful to be 
aware of the distinction between the emic 
lexical field of single ancient Greek and 
Latin words (mageia, goēteia, katadeō, 
magikos, etc.) we associate with magic and 
the etic lexical field of the words we use to 
translate them (magic, witchcraft, to 
bewitch, magical, etc.). 
  
                                            
5  Pike 1967, 8. 37–39. 
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Theories of Magic 
In order to situate the positions of Versnel 
and Bourdieu, here is a concise panorama of 
the theoretical positions on the nature of 
magic that were held explicitly or implicitly 
in the study of ancient Greek and Latin 
sources during the last hundred years: 
a) The view that magic is a primitive or 
inferior type of religion or of science is 
probably the oldest theory. It was wide-
spread until the 1950’s.6 Among scholars of 
the ancient Greek and Roman worlds, one of 
the last to have explicitly held this position 
was Alfons Barb. Barb proposed to invert 
Frazer’s evolutionary scheme and to see 
magic as a deteriorated form of religion.7 
b) As Mauss and Durkheim argued, magic 
could be anti-religious and potentially anti-
social inasmuch as it would consists in the 
appropriation of collective powers by the 
individual. 8  This sociological approach 
should not be equated with its extreme 
version – called the “thesis of deviance” by 
Bernd-Christian Otto or the “functional” 
theory by Versnel – in which magic 
functions solely as a delegitimising label.9  
Mary Douglas, for example, argued that 
those associated with magic are not simply 
the victims of disingenuous accusations. The 
fact that they are classified as magicians and 
sorcerers would also be dependent on larger 
correspondences between the structure of a 
given society and that society’s cosmology. 
Magic would be “matter out of place” – like 
dirt, or like the animals that Leviticus rejects 
as impure for consumption.10 
                                            
6  See Styers 2004. 
7  Barb 1963, 101. See, however, Jordan 2008, 6–
9. 
8  See, e.g. Mauss and Hubert 1902–1903. 
9  See Otto 2013, 313–316. 
10  See e.g. Douglas 1966, 95–114. For an applica-
tion of this theory and another counter-example 
to the idea that the sociological approach 
Jonathan Z. Smith’s latest study on the topic 
classifies magical rituals along with 
associations, which, according to Smith’s 
formulation, both correspond to the 
“religions of anywhere.” Following Smith’s 
tri-partite scheme, “religions of anywhere” 
are marginal in comparison to the “religions 
of here,” which concern the domestic 
sphere, and the “religions of there,” which 
concern states and communities. 11  The 
“religions of anywhere [...] offer means of 
access to, or avoidance of, modes of 
culturally imagined divine power not en-
compassed by the religions of ‘here’ and 
‘there.’ At times they might imitate, at other 
times they may reverse, aspects of these two 
other dominant forms of religion.”12 Despite 
the use of geographical terminology, 
Smith’s definition of the religions of any-
where is very close to Mauss and Hubert’s 
sociological interpretation of magic. 
Bourdieu proposed to see magic as a form of 
religion that has been dominated and 
proscribed not simply through brute political 
force but through the logical structure of a 
religious field. According to Bourdieu, this 
structure would have been formed according 
to processes of social differentiation (more 
on this below). 
Similarly, Richard Gordon suggested that 
we consider ancient Greek and Roman 
representations of magic as a sub-category 
of the marvellous, which itself represents 
“the totality of perceived infringements of 
culturally-stated rules for normality.” 13 
What would distinguish the strange from the 
marvellous would be that the marvellous is 
imbedded in discourses of truth and power.14 
                                                                  
equates magic with accusation, see Brown 
1970. 
11  Smith 2003. 
12  Id., 30. 
13  Gordon 1999, 168. 
14  Id., 169. 
Dufault, Problems Related to the Use of the Category of Magic  
 
176 
These are several examples showing that 
approaches linking the concept of magic to 
the creation and maintaining of cultural 
norms are not reducible to the idea that 
magic is the sole product of libels and of 
self-interested accusations. 
c) According to Hendrik Versnel, view b) is 
misguided because it attempts to explain all 
data according to the phenomenon of 
accusation.15 Versnel recognizes that the so-
called functionalist view has made advances 
but argues that evidence rather shows that 
writers usually described magical actions 
according to a single set of non-exclusive 
characteristics (more on this below). 
d) Against all of the above, others have 
claimed that the use of the word magic in 
modern historiography is misleading.16 This 
view is perhaps more popular among 
scholars who are not mainly concerned with 
ancient Mediterranean cultures.17 
e) Taking all of the preceding positions in 
consideration, it was also suggested that 
magic be kept as a label for a research 
domain, or that we replace this label by 
different “patterns of magicity” (e.g. the fact 
that certain words are assumed to exert a 
certain power), by which we could classify 
similar activities or ideas.18  
Of all the views presented above, Versnel’s 
and Bourdieu’s present the two most explicit 
methodologies and their studies occupy as it 
were the two most extreme methodological 
positions on the study of magic. Acknowl-
edging that the past is necessarily appre-
hended from our own perspective, Versnel 
suggested that we compare “our” own 
concept of magic with that of “the Greeks” 
                                            
15  Versnel 1991. 
16  See, e.g. Gager 1999; Otto 2011 and 2013; Wax 
– Wax 1963. 
17  See, e.g. Hanegraaff 2012; Otto 2011. 
18  See, e.g., Otto and Stausberg 2013, 10–11.  
and see what happens. The expected result, 
as suggested at the end of his 1991 paper, is 
that our concept of magic (and perhaps our 
culture as a whole) is very close to that of 
the ancient Greeks. In the case of Bourdieu, 
whose work on religion has been described 
as the blueprint for his concept of the “field” 
[champ],19 the notion of religion and magic 
stand as one example of several “symbolic 
systems” giving meaning to behaviours by 
putting them in a self-referential network of 
oppositions. Bourdieu’s article was an 
attempt at reconciling approaches that see 
religion as an instrument of communication 
and learning with those that rather 
emphasise the political function of religious 
ideology. Magic, in this theory, is what 
stands outside of religion but which compete 
with it by providing similar “religious 
goods” [biens religieux]. The stark contrast 
between the two articles frames an 
important methodological question: whether 
the history of ideas should take up the 
common-sense use of words (Versnel) or 
should strive to give them new ones 
(Bourdieu). The difference is major: while 
the first discusses religion as a set of 
psychological dispositions pertaining to 
theological concepts and assumes a shared 
mentalité with his object of study, the 
second discusses religion as a social 
structure and rather assumes to share similar 
social structures with the societies studied. 
  
                                            
19  See Dianteill 2002. 
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Religion and Magic from a Theological 
Perspective 
In order to define magic, Versnel proposed 
to stick to relatively common characteristics. 
Magic would be: 1) instrumental, 2) ma-
nipulative/ coercive, 3) mechanical/ proce-
dural, 4) non-personal, with short-term, con-
crete and often individual goals. By contrast, 
religion would 1) not be “primarily purpose-
motivated” and it would 2) view “man as 
dependent upon powers outside his sphere 
of influence.” Moreover, 3) its results would 
not be “dependent upon a professional spe-
cialist” and would depend “solely and exclu-
sively on the free favour of sovereign gods.” 
Finally, 4) religion would have “positive 
social functions,” i.e. it would be “cohesive 
and solidarizing.”20 Versnel defined magic 
and religion with theological concepts, and 
one can assume, by attributing theological 
dispositions to those performing religious 
and magical acts. 
a) According to Versnel’s version of the 
sociological approach, which he called the 
“functionalist” approach, magia, mageia, 
goēteia and similar terms only worked as 
delegitimizing labels. 
b) On the contrary, Versnel pointed out, the 
use of words such as magia, mageia and 
goēteia followed general patterns. Since 
these patterns were common to ancient 
Greek- or Latin-speakers we can conclude 
that the words magia, mageia and goēteia 
were not simple slander. In other words, 
activities categorized as mageia, goēteia and 
magia shared formal criteria, and these 
criteria were part of Greco-Roman “com-
mon sense.” Versnel concluded that the 
functionalist approach he described cannot 
explain why the activities denoted by these 
words share a certain family resemblance. 
                                            
20  Versnel 1991a, 178–179. 186. 
c) One might simply refuse to use the word 
magic. Studying the same material but in 
smaller categories (such as prayer, sacrifice, 
amulets, curse tablets, and so on) would be 
“unworkable.” Versnel did not explain why 
this should be so. 
d) As a way out of this dead-end, Versnel 
proposed to reformulate the approach of 
early ethnographers (which he called either 
“substantialist,” “substantivist” or “essen-
tialist”) by formulating a definition of magic 
according to a loose collection of “common 
sense” features. He called this type of cate-
gory “polythetic” or “prototypical,” by 
which he meant categories in which every 
element shares a “family resemblance” with 
the others without necessarily having the 
exact same characteristics. 21  “Just like 
religion,” Vernsel wrote22:  
‘magical’ practices or expressions may share 
some though not all family resemblances. This 
means that we may accept a ‘broad, polythetic 
or prototypical’ definition of magic, based on 
a ‘common sense’ collection of features, 
which may or may not, according to 
convention and experience, largely correspond 
to the items listed in the first part of this 
introduction: instrumental, manipulative, me-
chanical, non-personal, coercive, with short-
                                            
21  This view is often attributed to Wittgenstein. 
Wittgenstein, however, does not appear to have 
coined the expression “family resemblance” to 
produce a new type of definition by which one 
could reduce the meanings of a word to the 
meanings of other words, e.g. reduce magic to a 
set of characteristics (“instrumental,” “coer-
cive,” “performative,” etc.). He rather seems to 
have attempted to reduce all enunciations to 
language-games, i.e. according to Wittgenstein, 
words do not primarily signify, they are tools 
used to fulfil certain goals (see Wittgenstein 
2009, §363). To define is one of many possible 
language-games, and it consists in making anal-
ogies. It is the game of saying “x is like y” (see 
Wittgenstein 2009, §7–13. §69. §654–655). For 
a proposal to consider the most basic cognitive 
acts as analogical acts, see Hofstadter (2001).” 
22  Versnel 1991, 186. 
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term, concrete and often individual goals etc., 
and employ this as a provisional ideal-typical 
standard, coined by our cultural universe, and 
just see what happens. 
e) These observations have important 
methodological consequences for Versnel’s 
project:23  
It may be more rewarding to inquire whether 
non-Western cultures do or do not recognize a 
distinction between categories we introduce 
and, if they do not, ask why not (and why we 
do), than discard a priori our own conceptual 
tools, a psychological tour de force which 
many scholars believe to be an illusion in the 
first place. 
f) In the conclusion, Versnel supports his 
use of the label of magic and of religion to 
distinguish between to types of curse tablets 
by referring to the polythetic classification 
scheme just described. What he does in fact 
simplifies the distinction between religion 
and magic to a single set of opposed 
characteristics: divine impassibility vs. the 
coercible nature of the divine. Versnel drew 
attention in several articles to a recurring 
group of characteristics present on some 
tablets suggesting a different type of curse 
writing. He argues that there are two types 
of curse tablets: some that can be classified 
as magical, which he calls defixio(nes) and 
some that can be classified as religious, 
which he calls “prayers for justice” or 
“judicial prayers.” While writers of 
defixio(nes) often appear to have thought 
themselves able to compel divinities to, 
writers of prayers for justice typically 
supplicate divinities. The difference in the 
wording of curse tablets, following Versnel, 
would mirror the polythetic classification 
scheme he laid out earlier in the article. In 
other words, the difference in wording (but 
also in the place of deposition, as Versnel 
                                            
23  Versnel 1991, 185. 
argued elsewhere) meant that those who 
used prayers for justice did not see as proper 
to command divinities (or perhaps, to 
command a certain kind of divinity). Rather 
characteristically, the author of prayers for 
justice, 1) makes him- or herself known, 2) 
justify his plea for justice before the 
divinity, and 3) supplicates rather than 
command the divinity. One can, note 
however, that even though Versnel still uses 
a polythetic definition when defining a 
prayer for justice, only one of the four main 
characteristics by which he defined magical 
action correspond to the characteristics by 
which he defines a defixio: they coerce 
divinities (No. 2 above). The distinction 
between religious and magical curse tablet, 
then, would boil down to the principle of 
divine impassibility, since prayers for 
justice, although “religious,” are also 
“purpose-motivated” (1), they follow certain 
procedures (3) and they are “motivated by 
personal goals” (4). As far as curse tablets 
are concerned, the wording of the last part 
of Versnel’s article imply that magic could 
be defined as a rite performed by somebody 
lacking the theological disposition to respect 
the principle of divine impassibility. To 
focus on this theological principle to define 
one’s own category of magic is not 
anachronistic but it cannot explain all in-
stances in which magia, mageia and 
cognates could be used. In other words, it is 
not a definition that applies to all ancient 
phenomena usually understood now as 
belonging to the category of magic. The 
problem faced here is fundamental: the 
different uses given to words we translate by 
magic considerably varied in antiquity. The 
Apology of Apuleius is a well-known case in 
point. On one side, as Versnel argued, the 
specific accusations against Apuleius 
suggest that certain activities could be 
singled out as pertaining to magia and 
recognized as such in a Latin-speaking 
Distant Worlds Journal 1 (2016) 
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courtroom in second-century CE Libya.24 
Apuleius, however, also showed that Greek 
mageia and Latin magia could both refer to 
the venerable cult of the Persian magi. If 
that were the case, he claimed, there would 
be no reason for judicial proceedings. 
This is just one example of the impossibility 
to derive one single definition of “ancient 
magic” from all known uses made of the 
words mageia and magia without ignoring 
some of these uses. To summarize the 
problem presented by Versnel’s paper: if the 
“functionalist” approach cannot explain why 
Christians and non-Christians (for example) 
could agree that certain ritualistic charac-
teristics were essentially magical, the old 
essentialist approach of Frazer – and the 
new one of Versnel – cannot explain why 
the same practices (e.g. a prayer, a 
divinatory practice) were sometimes con-
sidered as mageia or magia and sometimes 
not. 
This means that if we are to succeed in 
defining ancient magic, we must develop a 
criterion of some sort that could account for 
entirely contradictory and exclusive uses of 
the word mageia. 
Religion and Magic from a Sociological 
Perspective 
The approach of Bourdieu to the question of 
religion can theoretically solve this issue.25 
Rather than suggesting that our category of 
magic (and religion) might be shared with 
those we study, Bourdieu took up a radically 
etic perspective and gave meanings to 
“religion” and “magic” that are far from 
representing current common sense. As far 
                                            
24  Apology, 25–65: looking for specific species of 
fish; private divination; a secret offering to a 
friend’s household gods; the celebration of noc-
turnal rites involving birds; the possession of an 
“ugly,” “skeleton-like” statuette which Apuleius 
would have called his king. 
25  Bourdieu 1971a. See also Bourdieu 1971b; 
Dianteill 2002; Verter 2003. 
as the field of ancient history is concerned, it 
admittedly raises issues but also provides an 
interesting solution to the problem just 
exposed: 
a) One could summarize Bourdieu’s notion 
of the religious field as the meeting of 
several theories. Bourdieu took over 
Weber’s socio-historical analysis of the 
division of “religious labour” [travail 
religieux; also called gestion du sacré/ des 
biens du salut/ des biens religieux].26 This 
division of labour, correlated with urban-
isation, would have produced a specialized 
class of workers, which Bourdieu called the 
“body of religious specialists” [le corps de 
spécialistes religieux]. Bourdieu also com-
bined Durkheim’s idea of the social origin 
of categories of thought with this hypo-
thesis. The combination of the two theories 
forms the religious field, a social arena in 
which actors compete for certain goods 
according to rules following a logic specific 
to the field.27 As with other fields, Bourdieu 
proposed to see a correspondence between 
the religious symbolic systems, social 
structures and mental structures: 28 
Religion contributes to the (hidden) imposition 
of the principles of structuration of the 
perception and thinking of the world, and of 
the social world in particular, insofar as it 
imposes a system of practices and re-
presentations whose structure, objectively 
founded on a principle of political division, 
presents itself as the natural-supernatural 
structure of the cosmos. 
b) Religious specialists manage the 
distribution of specific goods. These 
religious goods are soteriological in the 
sense that they are meant to save from death 
but also from anxiety, illnesses, and 
                                            
26  Bourdieu 1971a, 312. 
27  Id., 295–300. 
28  Bourdieu 1991, 5 (= Bourdieu 1971a, 300). 
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suffering in general. 29  Religious goods, 
however, are also meant to justify one’s 
specific form of existence, that is to say, 
one’s position in society. Bourdieu saw the 
basis of the need for religious goods in the 
“religious interest” [intérêt religieux], which 
includes the psychological need for safety as 
well as a justification for one’s particular 
place in society.30 
c) Religious specialists can only appear in 
societies in which religious labour was 
sufficiently divided, systematized and 
moralized.31 The religious specialists theo-
retically exert a monopoly over the 
management of religious goods. This 
monopoly is directly challenged by those 
represented by the ideal-type of the 
“prophet,” who can change the logic of the 
field and consequently oust its specialists. 
Religious specialists are also indirectly 
challenged by those who operate outside of 
the logic of the field and who offer 
competing religious goods. This is the role 
of the “sorcerer, the petty independent 
entrepreneur, hired on the spot by the people 
and exercising his office part-time and for 
money.”32 Merely by virtue of his role, the 
sorcerer delegitimizes the religious special-
ist’s monopoly over the religious field.33 
d) The domination that the religious 
specialist exerts over the religious field at 
the expense of the non-specialist is at the 
origin of the distinction between the 
legitimate and the illegitimate manipulation 
of religious goods, i.e. between religion and 
                                            
29  Bourdieu 1971a, 299. 312. 
30  Id., 310–318. 
31  Id., 300–304. Bourdieu ties these processes to 
urbanisation. While quite broad in scope, Bour-
dieu’s theory of religion was not meant to be 
applicable to all societies. See Dianteill 2002, 
13–14. 
32  Bourdieu 1991a, 30 (with correction, the origi-
nal “contre rémunération” was mistranslated as 
“without remuneration”). 
33  Bourdieu 1971, 308–309. 326–327. 
magic. This domination and delegitimisation 
cannot be simply explained by the religious 
specialists’ conscious attempts at elimi-
nating concurrence. Actors in the religious 
field are bound to its logic inasmuch as they 
have invested labour in the field. As 
Bourdieu remarked, legitimating processes 
remain invisible to the dominant themselves, 
who “transfigure” their political interests 
into religious interests.34 Rather than being 
the product of disingenuous accusations, the 
concept of magic takes its origin in the 
competition inherent to the religious field, 
and, consequently, in the division of 
religious labour that formed it. In turn, this 
division of labour enabled religious 
specialists to systematize religious knowl-
edge and practices to an extent that had not 
been reachable by those who had been 
previously busied with other forms of 
labour. In that sense, magic would be a 
symbolic system that has been outclassed by 
another on a politico-economic level as well 
as on an organisational level (i.e. in what 
regards its internal coherence):35 
Given, on one side, the relation that links the 
degree of systematization and moralization of 
religion to the degree of development of the 
religious apparatus and, on the other, the 
relation that links progress in the division of 
religious labor to progress in the division of 
labor and urbanization, most authors tend to 
accord to magic the characteristics of systems 
of practices and representations belonging to 
the least economically developed social 
formations or to the most disadvantaged social 
classes of class-divided societies. Most 
authors might agree that magical practices aim 
at concrete and specific goals, both particular 
and immediate (in opposition to the more 
abstract, more general, and more distant ends 
that would be those of religion); that they are 
inspired by an intention to coerce or 
                                            
34  Id., 316–318.  
35  Bourdieu 1991a, 13 (= Bourdieu 1971, 309). 
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manipulate supernatural powers (in opposition 
to the propitiatory and contemplative 
dispositions of “prayer” for example); or that 
they live enclosed in the formalism and 
ritualism of do ut des. This is because all these 
traits – which originate in conditions of 
existence dominated by an economic urgency 
prohibiting all distancing from present and 
immediate needs and unfavorable to the 
development of competent scholars in the field 
of religion – are, obviously, more often found 
in societies or social classes more 
impoverished from an economic point of view 
and thus predisposed to occupying a 
dominated position in the relations of material 
and symbolic power. 
Assuming the existence of a reciprocal 
relation between symbolic and social 
structures, Bourdieu looked for a correlation 
between the division of religious labour and 
the creation of a field possessing its own 
internal logic and enabling monopolistic 
claims. For Bourdieu, the symbolic systems 
that we call by the name of religion do not 
simply respond to “religious needs” (the 
protection from death, anxiety and suffering 
in general). They respond to “religious 
interests,” through which religious systems 
legitimize and naturalize economic and 
political domination.36 Conversely, the same 
politico-economical divisions explain the 
fact that religious specialists do not consider 
certain religious goods as such and that 
these religious goods are consequently 
considered magical by all those recognizing 
the monopoly of the specialists.  
This is where Bourdieu’s model can explain 
why magic can be recognized by its formal 
characteristics (the “essentialist” definition 
of Frazer and Versnel) and that it can also 
be deduced by the analysis of social 
structures (the so-called “functionalist” or 
sociological approach). If “common sense” 
                                            
36  Bourdieu 1971, 310. 
dictates that we find magic primarily in 
mechanical, do ut des rites, for example, it is 
not only because centuries of Presocratic, 
Platonic and Christian polemics have ruled 
against these rites. It might also be due to 
the fact that what we usually call magic 
“originates in conditions of existence 
dominated by an economic urgency.” In 
other words, we recognize magic in an offer 
of “religious goods” that has survived 
despite the fact that it was delegitimized by 
changes in a given religious system, or by 
the imposition of a new system of religious 
symbols (e.g., through military or economic 
colonisation) and of a new class of religious 
specialists. 
It is obvious that Christianity, and Catholic 
Christianity in particular, looms large in 
Bourdieu’s understanding of religion. This 
might not be too problematic for those 
studying the Late Antique world. As Versnel 
suggested at the end of his 1991 article, 
“our” concept of magic might be very 
similar to the ancient Greek one. Indeed, 
some of us continue to hold to some of the 
ways by which ancient Greeks and Romans 
recognized magic. In fact, the sociological 
approach to magic could also be said to have 
a pedigree as ancient as that outlined by 
Versnel. The idea that magic connotated 
social exclusion can be found in the work of 
Augustine of Hippo37 and it could also be 
traced further back.38 It is thus not only 
Frazer and his contemporary epigones that 
could be said to have held a Christiano-
centric or “western-biased” position; 
Mauss’s (and, to a lesser degree, Bour-
dieu’s) theory of magic, do seem to follow 
Augustine’s notion of magia: the making of 
“demonic pacts” in an alien language 
implying the identification of the speaker 
                                            
37  Dufault 2008. 
38  See Stratton 2007. 
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with a different society, the society of 
demons.39 
The idea that engaging in magic is to 
alienate oneself from society can be found 
again in the works of 19th century 
ethnographers such as Frazer, who defined 
magical thought as alien, irrational and non-
Western. It is also probably the association 
between “magick” and the anti-social that 
attracted the attention of Aleister Crowley 
and other fin-de-siècle occultists. In the last 
century, a host of people, starting at least 
with Gerald Gardner in the 1950’s, have 
described their practices as magical or have 
tied their origins to European witchcraft.40 
To the mid-twentieth-century witches and 
Wiccans, we could also add the writers, 
artists and activists who, throughout the 
twentieth century and beyond, have made 
use of the idea of magic in explicit or 
implicit critiques of their societies: e.g. 
William Boroughs, Brion Gysin 41  and 
Hakim Bey a.k.a. Peter Lamborn Wilson.42 
It is not surprising that the Dictionary of 
Gnosticism and Esoterism stated that 
Crowley influenced “new religious move-
ments of a magical and neo-pagan bent 
despite his bad reputation.” To have a “bad 
reputation,” especially in the eyes of the 
conservative, might rather explain why the 
figure of Crowley was and still is attractive. 
The question of finding what magic was for 
“the Greeks,” as Versnel wrote – and which 
implies the existence of a uniform concept 
as well as that of a mentalité that can “think” 
the concept uniformly – also obscures other 
problems, such as that by which language 
orthodoxy forces the dissimulation of 
                                            
39  See Markus 1994 with August. doctr. Chr. 2, 
20 (pacta quaedam significationum cum daemo-
nibus placita atque foederata). 2.24.37. 
40  Ginzburg 2004; Hutton 1999. 
41  P-Orridge 2003. 
42  Bey 2003. 
differences in social origins, and, con-
versely, how certain person can be alienated 
from their main language community 
because of social or physical differences.43 
In other words, asking what was magic “as 
the Greeks saw it” (rather than asking “what 
was the term mageia used for, and in which 
context?”) smuggles the problematic 
concept of mentalités into our work. 
Were “the Greeks,” as Versnel writes, 
“prototypically modern-Western biased 
rationalists avant la lettre?” Perhaps, but 
some of them also appear to have been 
proto-sociologists with a flair for social 
distinctions. As Versnel pointed out, if we 
begin by rejecting terms at the onset, we will 
not be able to answer them. Similarly, if we 
only authorize certain questions and certain 
definitions, we run the risk of only finding 
what we already know. 
  
                                            
43  It is curious, for example, that Philostratus 
made almost no mention of sophists from Egypt 
or Syria, even though we know through epigra-
phy that Alexandria and Antioch, to name just 
two “Oriental” Greek cities, produced plenty of 
them (see Bowersock 1969, 21–22).  
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